MQ’s Single-Dog Blitz Package

Dog Check: A five man pressure package built with BTF principles.

I get a lot of questions about packaging blitzes and how to go about doing so. I’ve written several pieces on the subject:

In the first article, I detail the theory behind the concept and briefly go over the setup process. In “Building a Better Blitz,” I detail how to design and use formations to create an adaptive Zone Blitz. Packaging blitzes are nothing new. Many coaches understand the concept of “blitz the formation,” or BTF. Coaches like Belichick, Rex Ryan, and Saban use the offensive formation to determine how to attack.

This concept of “packaging” blitzes/pressures from the same tree allows the defense to adapt to any situation the offense may throw at it. Generally, the most common way defensive coordinators utilize BTF is in their “all out” or max blitzes. The easiest way to demonstrate the whole process is to actually create a blitz package.

Below is Dog Check, a single-dog (one linebacker) pressure. It is a five-man pressure that uses an edge blitz by the LBs and a simple line movement. Each pressure within the formation is named and is unique, but when combined together, the “check” can now adapt to any formation reduce the guessing. The adaptiveness and flexibility that checks give to a DC are invaluable. Being able to eliminate verbiage and guesswork can be the difference between a tackle for loss or a touchdown (especially when tempo is involved).  Continue reading “MQ’s Single-Dog Blitz Package”

MQ’s 3rd Down Calls from a 3-4

Stop calls for 3rd down from a 3-4. Don’t just “drop 8.”

3rd Down

There are two trains of thought on 3rd down from a 3-4. Drop eight, sit back, play it conservative and tackle the ball in front of the sticks, or blitz the QB, put pressure on him right now and force a quick errant throw. Either philosophy can work, but it is important to know what the offense is trying to do. Obviously, the opponent breakdown is a huge key on how a team attacks third down. When a defense gets a team into passing situations it can attack by blitzing, or attack the passing scheme a team uses. Third down is when most offensive coordinators get conservative and predictable. They want to move the chains, that is obvious, so instead of attack a defense, they get conservative and just, “Try and get a first down.”

On obvious passing downs, it is important to have a plan. What is the offense trying to do in 3rd and medium situations? Is the offense an “all stops” team, a “clear out/HBO” team, or do they run a “levels” scheme and sprint out? The big question on 3rd and medium is if the offense is attacking down the field, or attacking the “sticks.” Many times in 3rd and med. situations, the offense is trying to attack the marker by running quick hitting routes that can turn into first downs. The question that needs to be answered for 3rd and long is, do they attack vertically, throw screens, or use the draw? Once a defensive coordinator has an idea on what an offense likes, he can attack the tendency. Every defensive coach knows, win 3rd down and win the game. Continue reading “MQ’s 3rd Down Calls from a 3-4”

Leveraging the Boundary

Using the boundary CB and Safety to confuse RPO and check-with-me teams.

Basing out of a defense that has split field coverage has its advantages when it comes to 2×1 and 3×1 sets. Many spread offenses split the field themselves, only reading one side of the formation. This allows defenses to take advantage of the one read RPO systems that many spread teams utilize. No matter what the defense throws at a split field match quarters team, it can align in the correct coverage. Another way to protect the defense is to formation the defensive play calls.

The single receiver and slot receivers are the main targets for RPO spread teams. They use the leverage of the secondary against the defense, reading dropping safeties and the depth of the corner. The single WR side usually sees the quick hitch or slant off of play action. Teams like Baylor use the leverage to RPO vertical choice routes. A defense can confuse the QB by playing with the leverage of the secondary pre-snap. This may seem like single-high to the untrained eye, but with a split field coverage scheme, a defensive coordinator can change the leverage to the boundary (single receiver side) and still run the base quarters scheme.

Continue reading “Leveraging the Boundary”